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62 abstract
Fostering an enhanced relationship between the tax administration and taxpayers 
is a promising approach for transforming traditional vertical relationships into a 
partnership based on trust and close, proactive cooperation. This article exami-
nes an example of such efforts, based on a pilot project in Slovenia called Hori-
zontal Monitoring. After two years of operation, the project has justified its exi-
stence and represents a solid basis for extension to a larger group of taxpayers.
Keywords: enhanced relationship, horizontal monitoring, pilot project, Slovenia, 
voluntary tax compliance
1 introduction
The typical relationship between a tax administration and a taxpayer involves a 
taxpayer that completes tax returns and discloses the minimum amount of infor-
mation needed to administer the required tax. However, the tax administration can 
demand additional information about the tax declaration and, if necessary, impose 
enforcement measures. In this relationship, tax intermediaries are not involved as 
direct parties, although they play an important role in influencing the taxpayer’s 
behavior (OECD, 2007). Because of the prevalence of aggressive tax planning, 
the OECD (2008) published a report focusing on the trilateral relationships among 
tax authorities, taxpayers, and tax intermediaries. It recommends creating a co-
operative, trust-based relationship with taxpayers, whereby tax authorities need to 
demonstrate certain key attributes: understanding through commercial awareness, 
impartiality,  proportionality,  disclosure  and  transparency,  and  responsiveness. 
This approach should lead to cooperative, trust-based relationships between tax 
authorities and taxpayers; that is, an ‟enhanced relationship.”
In addition, in 2009 the OECD published a report that focuses on the role of banks 
in aggressive tax planning and on identifying the benefits of including banks as 
large taxpayers in the process of an enhanced relationship (OECD, 2009a), and 
another study from the same year (OECD, 2009b) extends the coverage of a spe-
cial relationship from large taxpayers and banks to professional associations and 
government  bodies.  Several  tax  administrations  have  thus  recently  started  to 
launch special strategies and programs aimed at managing tax compliance, espe-
cially in relation to large taxpayers (important with respect to tax revenue).
In enhanced relationship programs, the tax administration’s primary goal is to 
stimulate the taxpayer and tax intermediary to cooperate and increase voluntary 
tax compliance. A high level of tax enforcement does not always increase tax 
compliance. In contrast, there are tax systems with a low level of tax enforcement 
and, simultaneously, a low level of tax avoidance. The key question for any tax 
administration is thus how to balance out the use of tax enforcement with stimu-
lation for voluntary tax compliance.m
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63 The OECD (2008) has identified three basic mechanisms applicable in the adop-
tion of an enhanced relationship: (1) a unilateral statement of the tax administra-
tion, comprising the enhanced relationship process, and the consequences for 
taxpayers and tax intermediaries in the event of cooperation and non-cooperation; 
(2) a charter adopted by the tax administration, taxpayers, and tax intermediaries, 
defining how they intend to work together and what they are expected to do, and 
setting out the consequences if they fail to do so; and (3) an agreement between 
the tax administration and a specific taxpayer, designed to meet their specific 
needs.
Supported by the OECD and other professional organizations, such as the Euro-
pean Commission (Fiscalis Risk Management Platform Group, 2010) and the In-
tra-European Organization of Tax Administrations (IOTA, 2012), the enhanced 
relationship programs are largely based on a series of studies devoted to tax avoi-
dance and tax ethics.1 The literature on enhanced relationships, especially rese-
arch, has been very scant so far. One of the purposes of this article is therefore to 
present an overview of the implementation of enhanced relationships worldwide, 
with an emphasis on the case of Slovenia.
We also present and analyze an enhanced relationship pilot project that was imple-
mented in 2010 in Slovenia called Horizontal Monitoring. Horizontal monitoring 
is an example of an enhanced relationship in line with the third mechanism of the 
OECD (2008) classification (given above). It was launched by the Tax Admini-
stration of the Republic of Slovenia (DURS) and includes eighteen of the largest 
Slovenian corporate taxpayers.2 The main hypothesis of the article is that horizo-
ntal monitoring has proved to be successful, with implicit potential to be applied 
on a larger scale, throughout the taxpayer community. To support this idea, we 
introduce a survey among non-participating large taxpayers that was designed and 
conducted especially for this purpose. In accordance with the findings, we can 
conclude that the concept of an enhanced relationship is widely supported, altho-
ugh further promotion is needed for the mechanisms to become established in 
practice. A discussion of the initial implementation of an enhanced relationship 
and the analysis of non-participation in an enhanced relationship are thus two 
additional contributions from this article.
The article proceeds as follows. Section two provides an overview of the imple-
mentation of enhanced relationships around the world. Section three describes and 
discusses the elements involved in an introduction of an enhanced relationship in 
the case of Slovenia, where we focus on the agreement with taxpayers, implemen-
tation issues, and evaluation. Section four analyzes non-participation in the en-
1 In addition to the economic factors, several other sociological and psychological factors determine the com-
plex individual attitude toward taxes (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Torgler, 2003).
2 In 2011, these eighteen taxpayers employed 20.1% of employees in large corporate taxpayers and 7.9% of 
all employees in Slovenia (AJPES, 2012).m
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64 hanced relationship process based on our survey. The final section concludes with 
the main findings.
2 overview of implementing an enhanced relationship  
  around the world
Among the initiators of an enhanced relationship were the Netherlands, Ireland, 
and the UK. The Netherlands started an enhanced relationship program called 
Horizontal Monitoring in 2005, initially including twenty large corporate taxpa-
yers.3 The program represents an attempt by the Dutch Tax and Customs Admini-
stration (TCA) to build greater trust in relation to taxpayers as a mechanism to 
encourage greater disclosure of tax uncertainties and risks. It is based on transpa-
rency, understanding, and trust. The TCA and participating taxpayers signed a 
non-binding agreement obliging taxpayers to notify the TCA of any issues entai-
ling a potential and significant tax risk. The basic requirement is that agreements 
are concluded with taxpayers whose tax control frameworks are solid. In excha-
nge, the TCA assures tax certainty (OECD, 2007).
In 2007, the program was extended to medium- and small-sized companies, tax 
intermediaries (such as financial and tax advisors or accountants), and various 
professional trade and industry organizations. The next phase in the program in-
troduces horizontal monitoring to software producers, in order to enable reliable 
reporting and monitoring in the entire chain from business transaction to tax re-
turn. The TCA emphasizes the importance of the attitude of participating taxpa-
yers’ top management to horizontal monitoring (the ‟tone-at-the-top” principle) 
because this is crucial for increasing taxpayers’ willingness to adopt voluntary tax 
compliance and for improving the internal tax control framework. From the point 
of view of a tax administration, it is essential for employees to have excellent 
knowledge not only of the particular taxpayer’s business, but also of its specific 
branch of industry in order to work with a particular taxpayer (TCA, 2008). The 
Slovenian Horizontal Monitoring program, introduced in 2010, is based on the 
Dutch experience and is being implemented with support from the TCA.
Ireland  introduced  its  enhanced  relationship  program,  called  the  Cooperative 
Compliance Programme, in 2005 (Revenue – Irish Tax and Customs, 2005; Grif-
fin, 2006). It aims to include large taxpayers that exceed certain turnover and asset 
thresholds. This program includes comprehensive supervision of all cases related 
to tax compliance issues. For this purpose, a special department has been establi-
shed inside the tax administration. Each participating taxpayer is assigned to a 
particular employee of this unit in order to enable prompt reactions.
3 In the Netherlands, as early as 2002, the Scientific Council for Government Policy recommended changing 
the relationship between the government and citizens from vertical to horizontal; that is, a move towards more 
equal relationships, as a consequence of international and social development (TCA, 2008). The government 
included the recommendations in the Other Government (Andere Overheid) program. These principles were 
also a basis for TCA pilot projects for developing new forms of cooperation with taxpayers and tax interme-
diaries; one of these was Horizontal Monitoring in 2005.m
i
r
o
s
l
a
v
 
v
e
r
b
i
č
,
 
m
i
t
j
a
 
č
o
k
,
 
d
a
r
i
j
a
 
š
i
n
k
o
v
e
c
:
 
s
o
m
e
 
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
 
e
n
h
a
n
c
e
d
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
 
i
n
 
s
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
8
 
(
1
)
 
6
1
-
8
0
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
65 The UK started its enhanced relationship program, called the High Risk Corpora-
tes Programme, in 2006 based on a unilateral approach; that is, the relationship 
arises  from  an  assessment  of  the  risk  connected  with  a  particular  taxpayer 
(Freedman et al., 2012; HMRC, 2012). The High Risk Corporates Programme has 
three strategic aims: (1) to induce corporate customers to take a less aggressive 
approach to tax mitigation and tax filing positions, (2) to increase the openness 
with which they disclose transactions and their tax impact, and (3) to collect the 
correct amount of tax from their transactions and profits as effectively as possible 
— if necessary, determining this through litigation (OECD, 2009c). In 2009, the 
UK also introduced a Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks. As of 30 June 2010, 
over 100 banks had adopted this code and many more, including most of the lar-
gest banks, were actively working towards adopting it (OECD, 2010).
In the EU, a form of enhanced relationship is also currently being implemented in 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Spain, and Sweden (Stevens et al., 2012). 
The concept is also known in Switzerland (Bugnon, 2012), in southeast Europe 
Macedonia introduced a program of horizontal monitoring (European Commi-
ssion, 2011), and the Croatian tax administration has been preparing to introduce 
a pilot enhanced-relationship program funded by the Matra-flex short-term pro-
gram (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2012). As in Slovenia, both southe-
ast European projects are being supported by the TCA.
Among the OECD countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. have 
also introduced such programs (Stevens et al., 2012). For example, the Compli-
ance Assurance Process (CAP) in the U.S. started in 2005 and represents a real-
time, year-by-year audit program devoted to large companies. The seventy-three 
taxpayers participating at the time of its introduction turned into 160 participants 
by 2012. The program starts at the beginning of a taxpayer’s financial year and 
finishes after its tax return is submitted. The taxpayer discloses all transactions 
and connected tax positions in real time, and any open issues are resolved with the 
tax administration before the tax return is completed (OECD, 2007; IRS, 2012).
However, there are several theoretical and practical concerns related to the enhan-
ced  relationship,  deriving  from  constitutional  (legal)  and  practicability  issues 
(Burton and Dabner, 2008; Druen, 2012; Stevens et al., 2012), such as conflicts of 
interest or unequal treatment of taxpayers. Freedman et al. (2012) found that the 
enhanced relationship program overall has been successful in achieving some 
aims (such as better allocation of resources within the tax authority), but not others 
(such as moderating the tax planning of certain types of corporate taxpayers). In a 
similar way, Burton and Dabner’s (2012) analysis of enhanced relationships in 
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK summarizes the difficulties in implementing 
the enhanced relationship as ideological tensions, legislative constraints, institu-
tional and internal constraints, and international pressures.m
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66 3 the enhanced relationship in slovenia:  
  the horizontal monitoring process
In Slovenia, an enhanced relationship project started in 2010 under the title Hori-
zontal Monitoring as a consequence of establishing the DURS strategic business 
plan for 2010-2013 (DURS, 2010). It became obvious while preparing the strate-
gic business plan that a small tax administration with limited resources needs an 
alternative approach to the standard vertical relationship with taxpayers and tax 
intermediaries, especially in the context of the complex environment of the on-
going (late-2000s) economic and financial crisis.
The new business strategy has therefore set increased voluntary tax compliance as 
the first strategic objective (DURS, 2010). Its implementation requires the servi-
ces of DURS to be provided in such a way that (Šinkovec, 2012a): (1) procedures 
are simplified for taxpayers that are willing to comply, (2) all necessary assistance 
is given to taxpayers that strive for compliance but are not always successful, (3) 
taxpayers that are not willing to comply are deterred from doing so with fast and 
effective identification of the evasion and avoidance of their tax obligations, and 
(4) all possible enforcement measures provided by law are applied to taxpayers 
determined not to comply.
In addition to the new business strategy, the initiation of the horizontal monitoring 
project was based on a series of studies and guidelines of relevant international 
organizations, such as the IOTA mentioned above, the EC/Fiscalis Risk Manage-
ment  Platform  Group,  and  the  OECD,  as  well  as  some  domestic  analyses 
(Filipović, 2009; Centa-Debeljak, 2010). These analyses revealed an already high 
level of voluntary tax compliance among the largest taxpayers. As a result, it was 
decided to commence a two-year pilot enhanced relationship project. From the 
outset, the TCA actively cooperated through the transfer of experience and know-
how, resulting in many similarities between the Slovenian and Dutch enhanced 
relationship processes.
3.1 agreement with taxpayers
In March 2010, the first public presentation of horizontal monitoring was organi-
zed in cooperation with the TCA, followed by a public call to all large corporate 
taxpayers4 that had already established a system of internal tax control (Centa-
Debeljak, 2011) to join the pilot project in May 2010. At this stage, organizations 
of professions were involved, such as the Bank Association of Slovenia, to inform 
and motivate large corporate taxpayers to participate. In the introductory phase of 
an enhanced relationship project, the tax administration usually approaches large 
corporate taxpayers first because they are typically low-risk taxpayers with a se-
ries of external advisors that also indirectly become part of this process. In this 
4 There were 721 large corporate taxpayers in Slovenia in 2010, representing 1.3% of all companies. They 
were very important from the viewpoint of public revenues, contributing 53% of the entire amount of corpo-
rate income tax collected, 54% of revenue generated, and involving 40% of all employees (Šinkovec, 2012b).m
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67 way, all three participant groups become involved. As a result, the starting number 
of participating taxpayers was fairly small; out of 721 large corporate taxpayers in 
2010, eighteen responded and were included in the pilot project of horizontal mo-
nitoring.5 Table 1 presents the structure by industry of large corporate taxpayers in 
Slovenia in 2010.
table 1
Structure of large corporate taxpayers by industry in Slovenia, 2010
Industry
all large corporate taxpayers Included in horizontal monitoring
number Percent number Percent 
Finance and 
insurance
90 12.5 13 72.2
Pharmaceuticals 2 0.3 2 11.1
Others 629 87.2 3 16.7
Total 721 100.0 18 100.0
Source: Own calculations.
Once the responses were obtained, meetings took place between the top manage-
ment of those taxpayers and the management of the tax administration, where 
details of the project were presented. From the very beginning, the project was 
based on the following grounds: (1) taxpayers joined the program with the expec-
tation that horizontal monitoring would increase tax certainty, which is required 
for everyday business; (2) the tax administration made it clear from the outset that 
during the program it would not perform tax advising in the sense of optimizing 
tax liabilities; and (3) rights and obligations deriving from existing regulations 
would remain unchanged.
Based on these initial meetings, cooperation agreements were signed with the 
participating taxpayers. The taxpayers thereby committed themselves to infor-
ming the tax administration about issues related to their operations that may invo-
lve tax risks. On the other hand, the tax administration offered to provide prompt 
opinions based on existing regulations and to monitor internal control mecha-
nisms of the participants.
The agreements do not interfere with the ongoing tasks of the tax administration.6 
However, the Horizontal Monitoring pilot project may lead to potential amen-
dments to the tax regulation, enabling the project’s permanent implementation. 
5 In 2011, there were 695 large corporate taxpayers, their share in total turnover amounting to 54.4% and 
employing 39.2% of all employees in Slovenia (AJPES, 2012). Of the eighteen large corporate taxpayers that 
responded to the public call, thirteen were financial and/or insurance companies with 11,427 employees, two 
were pharmaceutical companies with 6,136 employees, and three were other companies with 17,774 employees 
altogether (Šinkovec, 2012c).
6 During the Horizontal Monitoring project, the tax administration performs all of its ordinary services, such 
as supervision procedures or interpretation of tax legislation. Should the tax administration and taxpayer disa-
gree about the interpretation of tax laws, a supervision procedure can be carried out according to the provi-
sions of the Tax Procedure Act.m
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68   Compared to tax audits, which are retrospective in nature and concentrate on irre-
gularities in tax returns already submitted, Horizontal Monitoring focuses on the 
present and future operations of taxpayers and their interactions with the tax ad-
ministration. Horizontal Monitoring is derived from business processes and on-
going transactions; it examines the existence and efficiency of internal tax con-
trols and focuses on risks that appear before taxpayers submit their tax returns. 
Current issues related to the project are resolved at meetings with members of 
working groups. Where such topics are relevant to other taxpayers, the results are 
published on the tax administration’s website.
Operating in a complex environment that is subject to changes, these issues are 
especially significant for large corporate taxpayers. They have to operate interna-
tionally and face complex financial and fiscal structures related to tax risks in 
areas such as transfer prices, permanent establishments, and offshore activities. 
They encounter constant amendments to legislation, which they need to comply 
with and adjust to by changing their business processes, computer software, or 
even  complex  information  systems.  Due  to  these  ongoing  changes,  possible 
subsequent audits performed by DURS represent a great burden on taxpayers that 
are generally willing to voluntarily comply with tax regulations.
Therefore, following the introduction of horizontal monitoring, taxpayers expect 
a (limited) tax audit, primarily based on a review of the operations of internal tax 
controls. Instead of extensive and time-consuming audits, covering several years 
in the past, accuracy controls should be performed to a small extent, based on 
sampling.
Based on the results of the horizontal monitoring process so far, the advantages 
that taxpayers perceive in the enhanced relationship are: (1) a reduction of time-
consuming components of tax compliance, (2) updated and improved knowledge, 
and (3) greater tax certainty. Taxpayers expect better responsiveness from DURS 
to their questions and a confirmation of having accurately understood explana-
tions of the legislation, which holds consequences for management’s decisions 
regarding the financial and tax statements of their companies. They also expect 
proposals for the improvement of processes and internal control systems. They are 
willing to participate in preparing proposed amendments to legislation and would 
like to play an active role in formulating tax standards and legal bases.
3.2 implementation issues of horizontal monitoring
Agreements signed between DURS and the participating taxpayers represented a 
basis for setting up three working groups for implementing horizontal monitoring 
in the tax administration (Šinkovec, 2012a): (1) a finance and insurance compa-
nies group, (2) a pharmaceutical companies group, and (3) a group for other large 
companies.m
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69 Finance and insurance institutions were selected as the first target group based on 
the studies of international organizations already mentioned because they form the 
most appropriate group for the pilot project. The mandatory application of Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards, the supervision of the Bank of Slovenia, 
membership in the Bank Association of Slovenia, and statutory internal audits 
provide for a high level of tax transparency. This was backed by the DURS 
analysis for tax audits in banks from 2005 onwards (Centa-Debeljak, 2010),   where 
  a relatively low number of tax irregularities emerged in comparison to other indu-
stries. The selection of pharmaceutical companies to participate in the pilot project 
is due to their international status regarding taxation and associated risks (pres-
ence on the global market, transfer pricing, and residency status), and the third 
group includes the remaining large corporate taxpayers, including Mercator,7 the 
biggest retailer in Slovenia.
Each working group consists of tax administration staff members, who are tax 
auditors with long-term experience in working with large taxpayers. On the other 
hand, participating taxpayers also appoint a contact person to communicate with 
the relevant working group. These working groups perform the project in four 
steps: (1) they prepare and continue to update the taxpayer’s profile, (2) they con-
duct the introductory interview, (3) they monitor the taxpayer’s internal tax con-
trols, and (4) they are in charge of continuous monitoring of each participant 
taxpayer.
The purpose of a taxpayer’s profile is to inform working group members about the 
taxpayer’s business and tax compliance records. It includes data from tax admini-
stration databases (register of taxpayers, tax returns, control data for assessing 
personal income tax, implemented audit procedures and controls), data from other 
supervisory authorities, publicly available data about the taxpayer (i.e. from an-
nual reports, newspaper articles, websites), and data submitted by the taxpayer 
itself. This last element is particularly important because in the cooperation agre-
ement the taxpayer accepts the responsibility to inform the tax administration 
about all potential tax risk activities substantially and in a timely manner. The 
taxpayer’s profile is used by the working group’s members to define the critical 
segments of the taxpayer’s activities that their attention should focus on.
Equipped with the taxpayer’s profile, the working group organizes an introductory 
interview in order to establish personal contact with the taxpayer’s representatives 
and obtain additional internal data on business details, strategic goals, and existing 
7 Mercator d.d. is one of the largest Slovenian companies, with 12,000 employees in 2010 (AJPES, 2012). In 
October 2010, Mercator signed an agreement with DURS to take part in the Horizontal Monitoring pilot pro-
ject. The company's participation in the pilot project started on 1 January 2011 and will presumably last for 
two years. The main benefit the company expects from taking part in the project is greater certainty regarding 
taxation. In 2011, the operation of internal controls was reviewed in value-added tax accounting. In addition, 
DURS responded instantly and professionally to questions submitted by the company, and thus contributed 
to mitigating tax risks regarding major business decisions. For 2012, an audit of internal controls is planned 
in personal taxes and corporate income tax (Mercator, 2012).m
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70 external and internal control mechanisms so as to further extend its profile. Based 
on the TCA experience, the introductory interview opens a discussion in five cru-
cial areas: (1) the strategic goals of the taxpayer, (2) the internal tax control fra-
mework, (3) the information system, (4) tax functions, and (5) external supervi-
sion.
The key topic related to strategic goals is the participant’s long-term commitment 
to voluntarily compliance with tax legislation. At this stage, the top management 
of the taxpayer is usually included. It turns out that only a few participants (banks) 
officially accepted the internal tax policy act as an independent document devoted 
to tax activity (Šinkovec, 2012b). Discussions about the internal tax control fra-
mework seek to determine how the taxpayer administers its tax risks. Here the 
condition that the tax administration set out in the first public call becomes rele-
vant, that is, that taxpayers must already have an appropriate internal tax control 
framework in place. It turns out that companies that are subsidiaries of multinatio-
nal corporations generally have a professional approach to tax policy. Several 
multinationals have introduced codes of conduct and demanded that all members 
of the group (including Slovenian subsidiaries) comply with specific standards 
and models (COSO, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Savings Law). The informa-
tion system represents the technical basis and as such plays an important role in 
exercising tax functions within a taxpayer. Emphasis is thus placed on controlling 
mechanisms of the information system such as level of risk regarding data loss or 
accessibility of the information system.
In the introductory interview, the organization of tax functions is also presented. 
It may be organized in many different ways, depending on the taxpayer’s size and 
the complexity of its tax obligations, and is usually implemented in several orga-
nizational units (accounting, HRM, or sales). It turns out that almost all partici-
pants employ at least one tax specialist. During the interview, there is an emphasis 
on how the company transfers knowledge of tax changes and the tax strategy 
among its employees, along with how tax risks are recognized and controlled for. 
It is thus important to find out how tax returns for different taxes are completed.
Another integral part of the introductory interview is obtaining information on the 
roles of external auditors, advisors, and supervisors in the process of monitoring 
and facilitating tax compliance at the taxpayer level. This includes information 
about the frequency of their services (regularly vs. occasionally, or only in the 
case of difficulties); about the supervision of their performance, and what their 
attitude is to the taxpayer’s participation in the Horizontal Monitoring program.
The analysis of a taxpayer’s internal tax controls is the most important step in the 
horizontal monitoring process because its key principle is that the tax administra-
tion will rely to the greatest extent possible on the internal tax controls established 
by the taxpayer. It includes the examination and testing of tax control mechanisms m
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71 already established within a particular taxpayer, definition of potential risks regar-
ding these mechanisms, and their evaluation. Internal tax controls are evaluated 
with respect to their accuracy, timely tax reporting, and tax payments, and focus 
on the following issues (Šinkovec, 2011): (1) who is responsible for various inter-
nal controls in the company (including tax controls), (2) how the company exami-
nes implementation of the internal control procedures, (3) the level of cooperation 
among internal ‟controllers”, i.e. the tax specialist, the accountant, and the inter-
nal auditor, (4) the approach to tax risks (how often the company discusses them), 
(5) the relationship between tax compliance and ethics (tax morality), and (6) the 
degree of tax transparency within the company.
Internal tax control mechanisms are examined for all tax types. Due to its rele-
vance among government revenues, its complexity, and the numerous taxpayer 
questions about its implementation, value added tax (VAT) was covered for all 
participants as the first tax in this step. The examination includes checking internal 
control mechanisms for sales and purchase of goods and services (resulting in 
output and input VAT), verification of VAT documentation, and, finally, the accu-
racy of the VAT returns. The selection of documentation for testing purposes is 
performed with the help of Audit Command Language (ACL) software, such that 
standard  verifications  are  performed  and  documents  with  risks  detected  are 
submitted to the taxpayer. Internal controls in VAT go hand in hand with the infor-
mation system due to the volume of VAT transactions.
Following the analysis and testing, final reports are prepared by the working 
groups. Apart from findings of irregularities and deficiencies that may influence 
tax compliance, final reports include recommendations to the taxpayer’s manage-
ment in areas that may influence tax compliance.
The last step in implementing horizontal monitoring is the ongoing process of the 
continuous monitoring of a taxpayer, based on the taxpayer’s profile already esta-
blished and updated, and on access to its internal tax control mechanisms. It inclu-
des checking whether the recommendations have been adopted (e.g. establishing 
additional control points). The scale of continuous monitoring performed by the 
working group thus mostly depends on the level of internal and external control 
mechanisms provided by the taxpayer. The more it is able to monitor its processes, 
the less intensive the tax administration’s activity.
In line with these steps, the tax administration provides tax certainty to the parti-
cipating companies because the cooperation agreement obligates the tax admini-
stration to respond promptly to every question regarding current legislation. From 
1 January 2011 to 30 September 2012, DURS provided 131 answers to the eigh-
teen participating taxpayers, with the majority referring to VAT (42.7%), followed 
by personal income tax (24.4%) and corporate income tax (16.8%), as shown in 
table 2. During the project, regular meetings between the management of the tax m
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72 administration and the management of taxpayers are organized to promptly re-
view and assess phases of the project already performed.
table 2
Answers provided by DURS to participating taxpayers, 2011-2012
area of interest number Percent 
Value added tax 56 42.7
Personal income tax 32 24.4
Corporate income tax 22 16.8
Tax procedure  8 6.1
Double taxation avoidance 8 6.1
Financial instruments 1 0.8
Interests directive  1 0.8
Insurance contracts tax  1 0.8
Pension insurance  1 0.8
Real property transaction tax 1 0.8
Total 131 100.0
Source: Šinkovec (2012c), own calculations.
3.3 evaluation of horizontal monitoring
Following the OECD’s Tax Intermediaries Study of team requirements for suc-
cessfully  engaging  taxpayers  within  enhanced  relationship  programs  (OECD, 
2007), we can perform a qualitative evaluation of the Slovenian Horizontal Moni-
toring project.
Regarding the first requirement (i.e. commercial awareness), we can conclude that 
DURS has made its best efforts to achieve this first by dividing taxpayers in the 
pilot  project  into  three  groups  (finance  and  insurance,  pharmaceuticals,  and 
others), and then by appointing the most experienced tax auditors as members of 
each of these working groups. In so doing, the tax administration increased its 
ability to understand the given business, the major characteristics of the taxpa-
yer’s industry, and its risk appetites. However, the need for additional knowledge 
and experience, which mainly refers to particular features of individual industries, 
still increases.
The second requirement is an impartial approach to the resolution of potential 
disputes. This is reflected in the reasonable expectation of the participant taxpayer 
that, if disagreements arise as a result of voluntarily disclosed information in the 
course of the program, the tax authority will act objectively and fairly, and exe-
rcise its discretion in a considered, revenue-detached, and proportionate manner. 
The next requirement, connected to the previous one, is proportionality, aiming to 
assess whether the total amount of tax declared in the participant’s tax return is in 
line with the tax authority’s understanding of the underlying tax regulations. Be-
cause enhanced communication is an important tool for reducing potential uncer-m
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73 tainties and misunderstandings of the tax duties imposed, the program is believed 
to have been successful in these respects, although the results are difficult to me-
asure.
Disclosure and transparency are also essential elements of the reciprocity of the 
relationship. As stated above, the increased number of questions from taxpayers 
and opinions answered by DURS in the course of the pilot project reflect a mutual 
readiness for open discussions, a higher level of mutual trust, and to some extent 
an influence on drafting amendments to the existing tax regulations. The last re-
quirement on the OECD (2007) list is responsiveness. Notwithstanding its limited 
resources, DURS is taking important steps to improve its promptness and effi-
ciency, as well as the professional level of its operations during the program, par-
tially due to the incorporation of the experiences of other European tax authorities 
and a more focused, hands-on approach and communication with individual par-
ticipants.
4 non-participation in the enhanced relationship
After the public call to all 721 large corporate taxpayers initiated in May 2010 
ended, and the eighteen large corporate taxpayers that responded to the call were 
included in the pilot project of horizontal monitoring, the remaining 703 large 
corporate taxpayers were subject to a survey of non-participation, designed and 
implemented in order to determine the reasons for non-participation, the attitude 
towards horizontal monitoring, and willingness to participate in the future. In line 
with the experience of TCA with implementing the enhanced relationship, the 
survey was addressed to the senior management of a company, and this was veri-
fied in the questionnaire8 with a question on the position in the company of the 
actual respondent to the survey. Due to questions on willingness to fulfill tax lia-
bilities and to cooperate with the tax administration, the anonymity of the respon-
dent was ensured by a return envelope being enclosed.
In order to minimize the costs of the survey, 20% of the non-participating large 
corporate taxpayers were randomly selected, resulting in a sample of 140 large 
corporate taxpayers9 to whom the questionnaires were sent. Out of 140 compa-
nies, fifty-one responded, with a response rate of 36.4% and covering 7.3% of all 
non-participating large corporate taxpayers in Slovenia. Table 3 presents the struc-
ture of the sample of non-participating large corporate taxpayers by industry. The 
information on the industry of a large corporate taxpayer that responded to the 
survey was gathered by introducing a corresponding question in the survey que-
stionnaire.
8 Due to obvious spatial limitations, the survey questionnaire is not included in the article, but it is available 
upon request. In this article, only the results of the most relevant questions are addressed.
9 In 2011, the 140 large corporate taxpayers from the survey sample had a 10.6% share in total turnover and 
employed 7.6% of all employees in Slovenia (AJPES, 2012).m
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74 table 3
Structure of the sample of non-participating large corporate Slovenian taxpayers 
by industry, 2010
Industry
Included in the sample Responded to the survey
number Percent number Percent
Finance and 
insurance
11 7.9 6 11.8
Pharmaceuticals 0 0.0 0 0.0
Others 129 92.1 45 88.2
Total 140 100.0 51 100.0
Source: Own calculations.
The structure of the actual respondents according to position in a particular com-
pany was as follows: 27.5% of respondents belonged to the top management 
(CEO, chairman of the board, or general manager), 31.4% were members of the 
board (CEO, or deputy CEO), and 41.2% were from the lower positions (assistant 
director, director of finance and accounting, CFO, administration assistant, ac-
counting manager, head of auditing, tax specialist, or accountant). We can thus 
observe that many CEOs still transferred the questionnaire to subordinates that 
cover tax in their companies, at least in the non-participating large corporate 
taxpayers. There is probably still room (and need) for awareness-raising in Slove-
nian companies with respect to horizontal monitoring, although this could also be 
a sign of senior management’s trust in its subordinates.
The survey included questions related to companies’ familiarity with horizontal 
monitoring in the Netherlands and Slovenia, and the mode of acquaintance with 
the pilot project in Slovenia. Only 33.3% of respondents were aware that the TCA 
enters into agreements with taxpayers based on mutual cooperation, and only 
23.5% of the non-participating large corporate taxpayers knew that a similar pilot 
project was introduced by DURS in 2010. Most of the latter received information 
on the DURS website, followed by the media, professional organizations, and 
various workshops and seminars. These responses support our previous finding 
that greater and better-targeted effort should have been invested in promoting the 
project.
Regardless of whether the company was familiar with the pilot project, the pro-
cess of horizontal monitoring in Slovenia was then briefly presented. The respon-
dents were asked whether they would be willing to participate in the future, should 
the pilot project of horizontal monitoring prove to be successful. Some 86.3% of 
the currently non-participating large corporate taxpayers responded affirmatively, 
stating the main reasons for doing so as: (1) tax certainty (26 respondents), (2) 
support of the tax administration in introducing internal tax controls (22 respon-
dents), and (3) reduced likelihood of tax inspections (16 respondents). The seven m
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75 respondents that would not like to participate in the project justified their response 
with: (1) distrust of DURS (three respondents), (2) possible costs related to intro-
ducing internal tax controls (two respondents), (3) insufficient information about 
the project (five respondents), and (4) lack of resources in general (two respon-
dents).
There was also a question in the survey about the importance of internal tax con-
trols. Some 35.3% of respondents found them important and stated that they are 
already established in their companies, and another 41.2% thought that internal 
tax controls are important and would like to receive support from DURS in order 
to establish them. Moreover, an additional 11.8% of non-participating large cor-
porate taxpayers deemed internal tax controls important, although they would like 
to establish them with the support of external experts. The responses demonstrate 
a high level of readiness of taxpayers to establish a system of internal tax controls, 
which is an important condition for voluntary exercise of tax liabilities.
The results presented in this section provide important information for future de-
cision-making  by  the  tax  authorities  with  respect  to  horizontal  monitoring. 
Alongside more and better-targeted promotion of the project in the future, DURS 
should probably place more emphasis on the particular benefits of participating in 
horizontal monitoring, with demonstrations of existing good practices in Slove-
nia.10
5 concluding remarks
The enhanced relationship represents a modern approach of the tax administration 
to taxpayers and tax intermediaries. Even though this concept is relatively new, it 
has already proven successful in several countries, and it is leading to improved 
cooperation between tax administrations and taxpayers. It is resulting in better 
supervision and a higher level of voluntary tax compliance. With the cooperation 
of the TCA, in 2010 DURS launched a pilot version of an enhanced relationship 
project called Horizontal Monitoring, with the main purpose of improving the 
relationship with a selected group of large taxpayers that are willing to comply 
voluntarily. The key characteristic of such an enhanced relationship is that it tran-
sforms the standard methods of vertical taxpayer supervision into a horizontal 
partnership.
So far, horizontal monitoring has proved to be successful. Based on experience 
and evidence to date, taxpayers are showing greater willingness to cooperate with 
DURS and disclose their operations related to tax risks. They benefit from greater 
tax certainty through prompt and regular two-way communication with DURS. 
Both parties thus benefit from experience and mutually recognized know-how 
because the project has already induced additional training of employees in charge 
10 The outlook is nevertheless encouraging because DURS has been receiving many inquiries, especially in 
2012, from companies for inclusion in the project (Šinkovec, 2012c).m
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76 of individual tax procedures. DURS employees are benefiting not only from the 
new type of relations with taxpayers that are more willing to openly discuss sen-
sitive tax issues, but also from cooperation with the TCA. In addition, the results 
of the project have already enabled improvement of the system of internal tax 
controls for some participating taxpayers. In the long term, DURS expects to 
spend fewer resources supervising taxpayers, and thus be able to direct resources 
to other areas of its work.
Nonetheless, the project has also revealed some shortcomings. The greatest chal-
lenge for the participating taxpayers is the implementation of internal tax controls, 
because  this  is  a  time-consuming  and  expensive  process.  Some  participating 
taxpayers might also understand horizontal monitoring as a free ‟tax optimization 
service” provided by DURS, without implementing the disclosure of tax risks. 
Others are concerned about the disclosure of sensitive data related to their day-to-
day business. In addition, some concerns have emerged that participation in the 
project may violate the principle of equality with respect to tax authorities’ tre-
atment of participating and non-participating taxpayers (Hauptman, 2011). The 
results of the survey revealed that DURS should improve promotion of the project 
in the future, and place more emphasis on particular benefits of participating in 
horizontal monitoring.
The key elements of the pilot project – transparency, trust, and understanding – 
have nevertheless been fulfilled, and the project represents the right direction for 
further development of DURS. Because the final phase of the incipient implemen-
tation of enhanced relationship has passed (December 2012), the tax administra-
tion must determine whether the Slovenian tax environment is sufficiently deve-
loped to allow the general introduction of such an approach, whereby all taxpayers 
that are willing to comply voluntarily disclose their risks and establish an effective 
system of internal tax controls. Given the experience and evidence from the pilot 
project to date, it would be reasonable to include (at least) other appropriate large 
taxpayers.
However, several legal amendments would be necessary for the large-scale intro-
duction of horizontal monitoring, and even amended legislation cannot cover all 
taxpayers, although it could definitely include additional groups of suitable and 
motivated companies. Based on existing Slovenian experience and following the 
TCA approach, serious long-term candidates include consulting and accounting 
companies. It is also planned that at the end of the pilot project DURS will publish 
new recommendations for taxation standards, in cooperation with external ex-
perts. In the long run, the project is contributing to an improved tax culture and to 
the tax system in general, and is thereby increasing the international tax attracti-
veness of the country.m
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77 However, despite our best efforts to analyze and evaluate the process of horizontal 
monitoring, these conclusions are still based on mostly qualitative findings. The 
literature on the topic, especially research, has been very scant so far, and quanti-
tative measurement of the project effectiveness is still lacking. This is neverthe-
less an issue related to horizontal monitoring in general (Stevens et al., 2012). 
This article is thus only an attempt to narrow the gap between ongoing practical 
implementation and research on horizontal monitoring, and for the long-term suc-
cess of this concept, first and foremost, a set of well-founded measures (perfor-
mance indicators) should be designed and enforced.m
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